Why should I care about Singapore's climate change mitigation when I can't even see it on a map?
While Singapore may be physically small, it’s physical size is not representative of the size of its potential influence in the global economy and in shaping climate change policy globally and in the region.
This article presents
Cause for concern about Singapore's climate change policy
Progress on Paris Agreement based on official state policy and national circumstances
Critical reception and amendment proposals from the public
Analysis of responses to public feedback by the Government.
The aim of the article is to develop a clear picture of what the official stated position of the state is and the rationale argument for why the state defends its current policy.
Based on the evidence, it appears that while the state acknowledges the importance of climate change as an existential threat, and that it has some role in mitigating the effects, the state falls short of committing to act commensurate with scientific recommendations because it appears as threatening to economic strategy. The economic and political strategy reported by the Ministry of Trade and Industry prioritises first and foremost the growth in incomes, attracting private capital from international markets, not making large changes to existing policy and limiting the role of government (Chua Chun Sing, Parliamentary Question, 2020). The state reports that while it is willing to enable private markets to accelerate efforts to reducing carbon emissions where it fits with their business interests, the state so far is unwilling to step into the tripartite role as an intermediary and check on the power of private wealth when it is in conflict with the interest of the public commons, domestically and outside Singapore's borders (NCCS, response to feedback on public consultation, 2020). The conflict is a conflict about the role of state, citizens, and private wealth in the 21st century which is not unique to Singapore.
Cause for concern about Singapore's climate change mitigation policy
Singapore is host to the 7th largest refinery complex and a safe carbon haven for two of the big oil majors — ExxonMobil and Shell. Cleaning up the petrochemical complex in Singapore is one more step to ending fossil fuels worldwide.
It is one of the top 5 most influential and powerful cities in the world and leads in areas of finance, technology and academics and could be an accelerator for the pace of change, particularly in Asia and especially in the lagging Southeast asia (ASEAN) region.
Its advanced modern city design and strong executive capabilities uniquely enables it to be a model city of sustainable development for tropical cities, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa and ASEAN region, where are of highest projected growth in emissions. Having an at-scale proof-of-concept design will be a big win in averting future emissions
It is a financial hub for coal and oil and gas projects in ASEAN and greater Asia Pacific region
In 2019 the UN warned that current global warming is +1°C from pre-industrial levels and that on the current path of emissions the world is at risk of catastrophic levels of climate change in excess of 2°C of warming. The report warned that policy ambition by governments is far from what would be required to limit warming to safe levels of 1.5°C or less (UN, 2019). The UN report reiterated the findings of the 2018 IPCC special report on global warming of 1.5°C which set out the required emissions pathways and for 1.5°C corresponds to a 45% emissions reduction by 2030 and net zero by 2050 (IPCC, 2018). The IPCC report and the Paris Agreement state that wealthy, developed economies have a responsibility to lead with a faster rate of emissions reduction from the global targets to account for the historical emissions they have already consumed and allow for a greater share of the remaining carbon budget for developing countries (IPCC, 2018). Singapore’s current pledge to the Paris Agreement to increase by +24% by 2030 and zero emissions between 2050 and 2100 (NCCS, 2020) is far from the -45% target and rated as highly insufficient by 3rd party Climate Action Tracker (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).
Progress on Paris Agreement obligation based on official state policy and national circumstances
The state does not deny climate change nor does it deny it’s obligation to do something about it.
Can we, and must we do more? Yes.
- Desmond Lee, facebook post in response to SG Climate rally
The state acknowledges that climate change exists, is important, that the society of Singapore as a whole has an obligation to do something about it, and adopts an evidence based assessment to identify a comprehensive range of possible technical and policy interventions at all levels of society, business and government.
Going forward, even more ambitious action is needed to achieve the peaking element within our pledge, as our absolute emissions need to decline. We are studying how further advances in technology can help Singapore transit earlier to a low carbon future, and exploring the feasibility of working towards net zero emissions.
- NCCS, 2020 Responses to feedback submissions to public consultation
The current policy is presented by the National Climate Change Secretariat (NCCS) in the report Charting Singapore’s Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Future (NCCS, 2020). The measures effect on absolute emissions would depend on a number of uncertain factors such as population growth and future economic activity. Based on Climate Action Tracker assessments these policies would likely result in only modest emissions reductions from current levels and easily achieve the Paris Agreement Nationally Declared Contribution (NDC) pledge to increase by +24% (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).
The energy transition strategy presented by the NCCS is organized into “4 switches” - natural gas, domestic solar, imported renewables from the region including ASEAN Power Grid (APG) as well as potentially Australia and emerging low carbon alternatives, which includes Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS). Nuclear was briefly mentioned but not included as part of Singapore’s low emissions development strategy. The first switch is complete and the second switch commitment of expanding solar is to increase by 8x current capacity to 2 GWp by 2030 or 10% of peak demand and a lesser share of annual averaged energy demand in TWh/yr (NCCS, 2020). As of May 2020 there are no announced set targets committed for the third and fourth switches.
In 2019 the NCCS opened up a public consultation to submit feedback on climate change policy. Citizens and NGOs have submitted proposals to the government to improve climate change policy. The feedback recommendations and the government responses were published in a 94 page response (NCCS, 2020) and is summarized in this section.
The voices of critique come from a diverse range including Members of Parliament Louis Ng and Anthea Ong, political parties - the youth wing of the ruling party Young PAP and Singapore Democratic Party, as well as NGOs and volunteer civil society groups - Climate conversations, 350 Singapore, Singapore climate rally, LepakInSG and many others. One broad common theme is the recognition of the gap in emissions between what is recommended by the IPCC and current policy (NDC pledge) and many of the other specific recommendations are an attempt to close that main policy gap. Due to the open and free nature of the format of the discourse, in most cases it is not obvious to conclude on whether the government accepts or rejects any given proposal. For this reason the responses are classified into 4 types in a range from strong, partial support to ambiguous or overt rejection. Of the policy recommendations listed, none have been fully acted on although a strong commitment was signalled to phase out internal combustion engines from road transport.
Each of them have unique recommendations, some express critiques on a wide range and others offer more narrow critiques on specific policies.
Based on the evidence available from this report and other sources, the government’s policy response on climate change to these proposals is summarized into the following patterns and themes.
Support
(Act, Commit, Partial)
Public education and awareness raising about climate change science, risk and solutions
Intervene and accelerate areas which already have financial incentives in the market such as energy efficiency for buildings and industry
Funding resources for R&D and through businesses as intermediaries and partners in developing and implementing solutions
Oppose
Fast pace of change on any policy direction
State led market interventions such as feed-in tariffs, new or higher taxes, or larger public spending
An alternative basis for the social contract based on a wholistic measure of prosperity that does not depend on GDP growth or rising incomes
Restrictions on the petrochemical industry
Restrictions on businesses -- such as higher carbon tax level
Restrictions on convenience or luxury behaviors for consumers and households such as flight travel behavior or thermal comfort standards for air conditioning set points.
Positive support
Two areas of evidence of proactive policy commitments are in building energy efficiency and reducing emissions from private vehicles. Strategies for reducing emissions from building energy consumption include upgrading energy efficiency standards from the current Building Green Marks Scheme as well additional projects targeted at the urban scale such as district cooling (NCCS, 2020). A pledged phase out of the internal combustion engine of private and public vehicles by 2040 would potentially eliminate primary emissions from transport since rail public transport is powered by electricity (Tan, Straits Times, 2020).
Opposition
Climate ambition
Economic strategy
Carbon tax rate
Petrochemicals industry
Decarbonizing the energy system
Climate ambition
The IPCC and others have identified that to effectively reduce the emissions would require major changes to economic structure and policy
Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems (high confidence). These systems transitions are unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in terms of speed, and imply deep emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and a significant upscaling of investments in those options (medium confidence).
— IPCC, 2018 Special report on global warming of 1.5°C, Section C.2
Under the Paris Agreement framework, signatory states are responsible first for their territorial Scope 1 and 2 emissions, and then to consider for the Scope 3 emissions that are generated elsewhere as a consequence of their economic activity either upstream or downstream of the supply chain. Scope 3 also considers for financed emissions for banks and financial institutions that invest either as debt or equity holdings in companies that have a carbon footprint.
Singapore emissions in 2017 ranks among the highest at 8 tons per capita for Scope 1 and 2 and between 20-30 tons per capita for total emissions including bunkers from aviation, shipping and imported emissions from consumption in the top 90th percentile globally (Moran, 2018). The largest source of emissions 45% is from the petrochemical industry (MTI, Dr Koh Poh Koon 2019)(NCCS, 2020), followed by a relatively even share of 15% each between other manufacturing, transport and buildings and the remaining 10% attributed to households, waste, water and other sources. More details of Singapore's emissions, current energy sources and low carbon alternatives are presented in Decarbonizing energy in Singapore (Hickem, 2020).
Taken as a whole however the policies are far from what is called for by the IPCC for a developed country to be on-track with the targets to meet the Paris Agreement goal of 1.5°C. While Singapore has not applied to become a member of OECD, evidence of Singapore’s status as a developed economy is numerous and while it may be controversial or not discussed frequently, this is generally not a contested assertion (FAS, 1997). The GDP per capita is >$60k USD in 2019 one of the highest in the world (Singapore statistics, 2020).
Economic strategy
Closer examination of the actual policy commitments reveal a pattern of priorities and strategic philosophy that, taken as a whole, do not appear to embrace the urgency and willingness to adopt rapid and far-reaching transitions or a significant upscaling of investments from private and public sectors.
Instead, the evidence appears to suggest that policy prioritizes first the interests of business growth and the ability for the country to attract capital investments which is viewed as instrumental to economic competitiveness ahead of obligations for climate change. Economic competitiveness is mentioned several times in defence of resisting adoption of more expensive, lower carbon energy sources.
technologies that will enable transformational shifts to a low carbon future are still in their infancy, while others cited economic competitiveness and employment concerns
- NCCS, 2020 Responses to feedback submissions to public consultation
The claim that technology is a limit is false and the NCCS report failed to produce evidence to support this claim. To achieve the transition would require public investments as there are no inherent market incentives to make these transitions. For a public budget of 1-2% of GDP the IPCC targets can be met using existing technologies (Hickem, 2020).
Replace GDP as a basis for the social contract with a more meaningful measure of prosperity
The opposition appears to center on a tension between the objectives of increasing incomes and environmental objectives which occurs in multiple instances throughout the report, as well as an ideological conflict of the theory of economic strategy as it relates to the social contract.
[..] Pursuing economic growth and reducing carbon emissions are not necessarily mutually exclusive [..]
- NCCS, 2020 Responses to feedback submissions to public consultation
The state’s model of how policy affects economic competitiveness and why this measure has strategic political importance is less certain, but can be inferred from statements by the Ministry of Trade and Industry which has a clear mandate to deliver economic performance.
[..] To promote economic growth and create good jobs, to enable Singaporeans to improve their lives. [..]
- Mission statement of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Budget 2019
A recurring theme is the resistance to embrace policy that places governments in a more progressive position to intervene and direct economic activity, and the belief that dynamics in private markets is a more effective mechanism for solving social problems.
If you leave the market to itself I think they would do wonders. I’ve heard a similar story in one of these countries that said “if only the government don’t do anything - we will get 6% growth”.
- Chan Chun Sing, Minister of Trade and Industry 16 May 2016 St Gallen Symposium
Based on the official statements on economic strategy offered by the Minister Chan Chun Sing, the state’s social contract with the public is founded on the general goal of improving lives as narrowly interpreted through the lens of participation in the market based activities and income growth. The Minister describes a model of achieving income growth that believes that investments are critical to sustained wage growth.
We strive for economic growth to achieve three objectives:
• to give our people better jobs and better lives;
• to provide our people the opportunities to fulfil their potential and aspirations; and
• to grow Singapore’s economic strength for strategic relevance in the world.
Our economic strategies are developed to improve the quality of life and livelihoods for Singaporeans. Quality jobs provide good wages, and good wages and opportunities enable Singaporeans to pursue our dreams.
Quality jobs come from quality investments – local and foreign. [...]
[...] The competition for quality investments has never been easy. Without natural resources, we strive hard to create our own competitive advantages and build up a strong reputation and trusted brand name for Singapore based on the following:
• political stability. rule of law, consistency of policy execution over the long term
• a progressive business environment, intellectual property protection
• cohesive tripartite relations
• skilled workers
• physical and non-physical connectivity of air, land, sea, data, finance, talent, technologies and regulations
- Chan Chun Sing, 4 Feb 2020 Parliamentary Question response
Attracting private capital and avoiding public spending projects is not the only means to achieving economic competitiveness nor is it a foregone conclusion that this narrow definition of economic competitiveness that is in conflict with climate change goals produces good equitable outcomes for all members of society. In the wake of the coronavirus economic crisis, the evidence becomes more compelling that the state is at least as competent as a source of investments for job creation as the private sector. What is missed in this narrow definition of economic competitiveness is the potential for public investments in the transitions in industry and energy sectors to create jobs. While the relationship between total, or aggregate investments and job creation is noncontroversial, another qualitative feature of the political strategy is the nature of the investment, specifically the share of private vs public investments. While an exhaustive analysis of the debate on the relative efficiency of investment between the private and public sector is beyond the scope of this article, a few key points can be drawn from a survey of the literature.
A review of the literature reported by an IMF working paper in 1996 before the most recent financial crisis in 2008 and 2020 concluded that (1) there is at best a weak negative relations relationship between the total tax burden and real GDP growth (2) what is more significant is the structure of taxation, and whether it is directed towards the core drivers of long term prosperity (3) public investments can produce net economic improvement when the social benefits of the investments exceed the opportunity costs from private investment (4) the objective of rising incomes and reducing inequality are generally mutually exclusive or conflicting policy agendas in developed economies (IMF, 1996). So the more important question to clarify from Chua Chun Sing’s statement of improving lives is which lives would be improved. Reports by the IMF and other economists have concluded that the social costs of delaying action on climate change exceed the costs of acting early to mitigate by investments in low carbon energy transformation (IMF, Macroeconomic and Fiscal Policies.. 2019). A Green New Deal has the potential to provide economic stimulus that raises the standard of living for the lower and middle income groups by creating hundreds of thousands of jobs financed through public investments. It is estimated that up to 14 million jobs could be created in Asia Pacific from new green industries (ILO, 2018). Singapore like many developed countries recognizes the potential for the state to make long term improvements through public investments through many legacy progressive social programs such as CPF, Medishield, HDB and SkillsFuture and the proportionately high level of public investment spending on education.
On the question of whether it is a better social outcome to prioritize growing incomes, there is growing consensus that GDP is a poor measure of social progress for improving lives. Japan has sustained up to a decade of low to flat GDP growth rates <1% while still sustaining progress on reducing poverty and human development (Kusago, 2006). GDP since it’s introduction in the 1930’s in the United States has been criticized as a blunt measure and it’s creator Simon Kuznets warned that it should not be confused as a measure of social progress or well being for a nation (Thompson, 2016). GDP misses important measures, externalities that undermine long term prosperity. An alternative measure - Genuine Progress Indicator accounts for these externalities and subtracts them as costs to GDP, and when applied to Singapore the Genuine progress peaked in 2005 and is now on the decline, and for the world Genuine Progress peaked in the 1970’s and has been stagnated since (Delang, 2016) (Kubiszewski, 2013). The statistical and theoretical link between GDP and energy inputs is strong and the weight of evidence of historical progress suggests that the pace of “decoupling” of GDP and energy is too slow to meet the required targets (Jackson, 2017). New economic models “doughnut economics” are being adopted in Iceland and Amsterdam which reject GDP as a national priority and focus instead on direct measures of human development and well-being (Boffey, 2020)(BBC, 2019)(Raworth, 2017).
Carbon tax
Raise carbon tax from current US $4 to IMF recommended level of $75/ton by 2030
The resistance to the proposal to set the price of carbon to the internationally recommended level of S $55-100/ton by 2030 appears to be rationalized by a perceived conflict between economic strategy and environmental objectives.
[..] The Government intends to increase the carbon tax rate to between $10/tCO2e and $15/tCO2e by 2030. In doing so, we will take into account international developments, the progress of our emissions mitigation efforts, and our economic competitiveness. [..] The range of suggested carbon prices put forward by different international organisations reflects different assumptions on what other policy interventions are in place. [..] Our carbon tax level cannot be directly compared with that in other jurisdictions.
- NCCS, 2020 Responses to feedback submissions to public consultation
Economists (Stern, Stigiltz, 2017)(Long, 2019) and the IMF (IMF 2019 Fiscal Monitor) recommended at a minimum US $75/ton in order to incentivise the private capital markets to invest in these switches. While obviously these companies will bear higher costs in the short run, it is not a foregone conclusion that this would make the country more or less economically competitive for two reasons. The first is that the counter-argument to the ‘race to the bottom’ is the ‘race to the top’ (Vogel, 1999) where business models which have a higher environmental standard are more economically competitive in a future world that has shifted politically towards a global effort to reduce carbon emissions. The upgrading investments for ExxonMobil Singapore expansion to meet higher sulfur emissions standards was justified using this same ‘race to the top’ logic (Sahu, 2019). This carbon tax price level could generate sufficient revenue to pay for many of the transition costs. The second reason why a higher carbon tax may improve economic competitiveness is if it is successfully invested into new low carbon growth industries. The forecasted market potential for low carbon, green industries is in the trillions globally (Bloomberg, 2019) and the high carbon oil and gas industry has been one of the worst performers over the past 10 years and have substantial financial risks in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic (Harvey, 2020).
While not stated by the NCCS, another concern which has been raised by political opposition party Singapore Democratic Party (SDP, 2020) as a potential political feasibility concern for how receptive the public would be is the concern that the costs of a higher carbon tax would be passed on to consumers rather than incentivising switching to alternative energy sources. The concept of revenue-neutral carbon tax policy means that the policy is designed so that the cost of the tax is not shifted onto low and middle income households. This can be achieved through a variety of mechanisms either in the form of a dividend rebate, payroll tax reduction, or increased funding for social programs to reduce cost of basic needs - housing, healthcare, education. The decision to invest the revenues into social investments in healthcare, education or to decarbonization are not mutually exclusive and there is the possibility of a split budget scenario. The best is a holistic approach that combines multiple revenue sources including consumption tax on non-essential materials which is an effective carbon tax aimed at wealthy consumers from the demand side.
Petrochemical Industry
Divest, transition out of the domestic petrochemical and oil and gas sector
Restrictions on the petrochemicals sector in particular, is an area of particularly strong resistance from the state. This resistance is despite a clear acknowledgement of it’s central role as the cause of emissions and climate change both globally and domestically in Singapore.
The petrochemical industry [..] is an important sector for Singapore, in terms of direct and indirect contributions to the economy, to jobs and to livelihoods. What we will do is that we will work with the industry players to make sure that what we have in Singapore is best-in-class. Because we do not just produce to meet Singapore’s domestic needs. Our petrochemical industry actually serves the whole world
- Chee Hong Tat, Senior Minister MTI, 2020 response to proposal to shift away from oil and gas industries
We are working closely with the industry to make it more environmentally friendly, for example, by using more energy-efficient equipment [...] So we will continue to grow the petrochemical industry, but we must reduce our emissions, both of greenhouse gases as well as other more local pollutants, for example, SO2 – sulphur dioxide.
BUT
at the same time, I want to assure all the energy and petrochemicals companies here that the Singapore Government stands fully behind them and will continue to help them to succeed. These companies, including ExxonMobil, depend on us to maintain a predictable environment for their investments to succeed over the long-term, to make it worthwhile for them to operate in Singapore despite our natural constraints such as land or feedstock. We fully understand these considerations, and we will fully honour our commitments to these companies which have placed their trust in Singapore. So I would like to thank ExxonMobil for being such an excellent partner. We wish you every success with the expanded Singapore Chemical Plant, and we congratulate you on your 120 years in Singapore. I think it is a special kind of a wedding anniversary. We look forward to many more years of success together.
- Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister 2014, Speech at opening ceremony ExxonMobil Chemical Plant Expansion
Petrochemicals has an outsized impact on Singapore’s climate change obligation and questionable economic benefit relative to the social and political liability. Contribute 45% of emissions (NCCS, 2020) and represent an estimated 3% of GDP and less than 2% of the workforce (Statistics Singapore, 2020), with another possible 10-15% of GDP from peripheral services such as construction and engineering firms (Low, 2020). The petrochemicals business is based on transportation fuels, 80-90% of the products sold on tonnage or dollar basis end up as fuels. Durable polymers, prosthetics and building construction materials -- make up by comparison a minor contribution to the overall business revenues (EIA, 2020). These transportation fuels have no low carbon substitutes and are incompatible with a stable climate limited to 1.5C of warming. The downsizing of the industry is important since any country or company which continues to support the industries faces both political and financial risks. Prior to the coronavirus economic crisis up to US $12 trillion of stranded assets by 2035 of fossil fuels - coal, oil and gas were identified (Mercure, 2018) that cannot be burned and must be kept in the ground. These risks for the petrochemical industry apply more broadly to all of the sunset industries in Singapore whose business model depends on the perpetuation of long distance trade and shipping that burns fossil fuels and non-essential materialistic consumption with no viable substitute in the zero emissions economy.
The first step to downsizing the industry is to invest and grow the new green growth industries. Singapore only needs to capture a small slice of the pie of the Asia Pacific green growth market to more than compensate for the losses from the sunset industry. The other component of downsizing is taking care of the workers, not only by creating the new job opportunities, but also paying for the workers transition - both living expenses during the transition and retraining. For some workers, especially those nearing retirement, a career transition may not be the best move, and an early retirement package may make more sense. The third component for transitioning the industry is cleaning up the smaller footprint residual industry that could continue to supply chemical materials and polymers with on-site carbon capture. The investments required to clean up this new industry could make up a large portion of the new green growth job stimulus.
Decarbonizing Energy
Fully decarbonize energy system
While Solar PV and CCS have been identified and researched thoroughly for their potential for decarbonizing Singapore’s energy supply, they have not been committed to the level of public funding that would be necessary to ensure they are implemented in the timeline required to meet the IPCC reduction targets for 1.5C global warming. Nuclear, while not essential but would be useful at containing costs, has been taken off as an option without a corresponding level of transparent research to defend or justify the decision. The state only reports that it conducted a preliminary feasibility assessment and determined that the state of the technology isn’t ready yet in a “just-so” defence without providing any further evidence to defend this decision (NCCS, 2020)
According to the IPCC the available low carbon energy alternatives are solar PV, wind, geothermal, hydroelectric, biomass, CCS and nuclear. More than 90% of the electricity is provided by natural gas with the balance from waste-to-energy and domestic solar (NCCS, 2020). There are a number of oil and gas reserves and a number of suitable geological formations for up to 70-700 years of long term carbon dioxide storage capacity in the region (Hickem, 2019). Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam have gas fields and Indonesia has a number of oil fields. While there are limited sources of geothermal in Philippines, Indonesia, wind in Vietnam and hydroelectric in Laos, the main renewable source available at scale is solar photovoltaic (PV) (Hickem, 2020). Certain members of ASEAN have promoted a call for an ASEAN wide power grid (APG) which could facilitate the deployment of renewables within the Southeast Asia region. (Hickem, 2020). The considerations for selection of the right mix of these options include, but not limited to levelized costs (LCOE), intermittency, land requirement, and life-cycle environmental impact. The LCOE is calculated by dividing the entire lifecycle cost of a solar PV system by its cumulative solar electricity generation. It is presented in net present value terms, with each year’s cost discounted by the investor’s hurdle rate (SERIS, 2020).
Singapore’s small geographical area is a potential consideration for which energy sources could be sourced domestically vs those that would be imported. The lowest LCOE of the three options is solar PV at $US 0.04 per kWh excluding the cost of grid investments in batteries and transmission lines, followed by nuclear at $US 0.06 per kWh and the most expensive option is CCS at $US 0.09 /kWh. Each of these has a high level of uncertainty such that the ranges overlap (Hickem, 2020). Intermittent sources that derive from the sun’s energy - solar, wind require either additional grid investments or combination with base load such as nuclear and a dispatchable energy source such as natural gas with CCS. In a tropical, equatorial climate the intermittency storage requirement for solar at scale must be able to handle in addition to the 24 hour night and day cycle, supply interruptions of a few days during periods which occur seasonally. The energy source with the lowest land requirement is nuclear, followed by CCS and the highest land requirement per kWh is solar. The total lifecycle analysis considers residual carbon emissions, land, water inputs and mining/mineral inputs. The residual carbon emissions for solar PV is in the range of CCS at 100-200 kg/kWh and is very low for nuclear 12 g/kWh, and the mineral impacts for all options are small compared to the lifecycle cost of land and residual emissions. The overall result of land and residual carbon emissions on a life-cycle normalized to kWh basis show that nuclear, CCS are competitive with solar PV. A detailed comparison of the available low carbon energy sources is presented in the report Decarbonizing energy in Singapore (Hickem, 2020). The conclusion from an analysis of all of the available low carbon energy sources available for Singapore is that there are plenty of scalable opportunities from existing technologies. To realize the energy transition should not rely on a single solution but rather a mix of solar PV, CCS, and possibly nuclear and would require substantial public investments mixed with strong carbon taxes in order to make the projects economically viable. The budget estimated to pay for these investments of 1-2% of GDP is well within what economists suggest is worthwhile to justify the social costs of business-as-usual.
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